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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH N. SILLIMAN and 
UTAH ALLOY ORES, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs-Apellants, 
vs. 
REX T. POWELL, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Appeal No. 17054 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This suit was commenced by plaintiffs-appellants to 
quiet title to their unpatented lode mining claims in the 
unorganized mining district known as Yellow Cat, located in 
Grand County, Utah, after defendants-respondents attempted to 
locate claims overlying those of appellants, to recover damages 
for slander of title, and to recover treble damages under Utah 
Code Ann. § 40-1-12 (1953), for ores wrongfully removed from 
some of said claims. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried before the Honorable A. John 
Ruggeri, Judge Pro Tern of the Seventh Judicial District in and 
for Grand County, sitting without a jury, on March 19-23, 1979, 
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and on April 3, 1979. During the trial, defendant Penromer Co. 
Ltd. entered into a stipulation of settlement with plaintiffs-
appellants and with Powell defendants (Trial Transcript, 
Friday, March 23, 1979 at 679-81). A settlement of all issues 
between the plaintiffs-appellants and Rowe defendants was 
stipulated to soon after trial on May 14, 1979, and was 
recorded June 5, 1979. All remaining parties then submitted 
briefs to the court which issued its Memorandum Decision August 
30, 1979, in favor of the defendants-respondents. When 
respondents finally submitted proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in late January 1980, appellants made formal 
objections to the failure of the findings to specify, inter 
alia, the value of assessment work done benefitting appellants' 
claims. Objections were also made to the mischaracterization 
of the settlement between appellants and Rowe defendants, to 
the inclusion of findings of fact on issues settled between the 
parties, and to conclusions of law based on the objectionable 
findings (Record at 262-64). As approved by the court in 
unaltered form, these findings and conclusions stated that 
appellants failed to meet their alleged burden of showing that 
the assessment work done by appellants for assessment years 
ending September 1, 1973, through September 1, 1977, was 
sufficient in both character and amount to meet the 
requirements of 30 U.S.C. § 28, and thus the court found that 
the relocations subsequently made by defendants-respondents 
over appellants' claims were valid. 
-2-
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Although appellants showed that substantial assessment 
work had been done for their claims, the court in effect ruled 
that since it found the work insufficient to satisfy the 
assessment requirement as to all claims, the work was 
insufficient to meet the requirement as to any claims. The 
court's failure to make any findings as to the actual value of 
the assessment work done by the appelllants apparently resulted 
from this conclusion. 
The final decree of the court, entered February 13, 
1980, while in some measu~e correcting the findings as to the 
nature of the stipulations of settlement entered into between 
appellants on the one hand and the Rowe and Penromer defendants 
on the other hand (though misstating the date of the 
appellants-Penromer stipulation as March 22, 1979, instead of 
March 23, 1979), otherwise quieted title to all claims in 
conflict in the respondents. The decree also dismissed 
appellants' damage claims, dissolved a temporary restraining 
order and temporary injunction previously entered prohibiting 
respondents from removing or selling uranium ore from the 
claims in conflict until entry of the final judgment, and 
awarded respondents their costs. The Findings of Fact and 
Final Decree were later amended by court order of March 12, 
1980, adding six mining claims of Powell respondents included 
in their counterclaim, but inadvertently omitted from the 
original findings and decree. 
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A motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure based on the discovery of new evidence 
and accompanied by supporting affidavits was made by appellants 
March 12, 1980, and denied the same day. The notice of appeal 
was also filed March 12, 1980. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants request that this Court reverse and vacate 
the judgment and findings of the Seventh Judicial District 
Court for Grand County, and remand this case for a new trial on 
the issue of the adequacy and sufficiency of the assessment 
work performed by appellants on their claims during the period 
September 1, 1972, through September 1, 1978. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This lawsuit was filed by appellants January 10, 1977, 
to quiet title to eighty-four (84) unpatented lode mining 
claims and one millsite situated in the Yellow Cat mining 
district in Grand County, Utah. These claims of appellants are 
valuable principally for their uranium and vanadium deposits. 
Virtually all of the claims are situated more or less along a 
three and one-half to four-mile long axis extending from the 
Little Pittsburgh No. 8 in the northeast corner to the Molly 
Hogans and the Silver Moon in the extreme southwest corner. 
All but eight (8) of the 84 claims are part of a single, 
continuous, multi-branching chain of overlapping and 
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immediately adjoining claims. (See Plaintiffs' Exhibits nos. 11 
and 12.) 
Twenty-six of the appellants' claims were originally 
located prior to 1937 and were deeded to appellant Utah Alloy 
Ores, Inc. in 1937. The balance of the claims were located by 
Utah Alloy Ores, Inc. during the years 1938 through 1956 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2). In February and December of 1976, 
appellant Kenneth N. Silliman acquired in his own name from 
appellant Utah Alloy Ores, Inc. all but three (3) of the 84 
claims. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 29.) Also in 1976, appellant 
Silliman, with members of his immediate family, became a 
controlling shareholder of Utah Alloy Ores, Inc. (Trial 
Transcript [hereinafter Tr.] at 279). 
Since May 1948, appellant Kenneth N. Silliman has been 
associated with the property at issue in this suit and with 
plaintiff Utah Alloy Ores, Inc. (Tr. at 278-79). Appellant 
Silliman first began performing assessment work on the claims 
in 1948 and from the early 1950's he has served as Utah Manager 
and as a Director of Utah Alloy Ores, Inc. (Tr. at 281-82). In 
those capacities appellant Silliman has, from the early 1950s, 
been very much involved with the development of the claims and 
the drilling and mining thereon, with the hiring of miners, 
with the negotiation of contracts, both with drilling companies 
and with receiving stations, and with the negotiation of leases 
of the claims both to others and to himself (Tr. at 281-82). 
During the period 1948 to 1972, there was continuous mining 
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activity on appellants' claims (Tr. at 312). During those 
years, appellant Silliman built roads servicing the claims (Tr. 
at 306), performed other assessment work on the property (Tr. 
at 307, 315), assisted in the location of new claims and in the 
posting of notices (Tr. at 291), hauled ore from the claims 
(Tr. at 283, 310-11), and supervised mining activities on the 
claims (Tr. at 311). Appellant Silliman also managed drilling 
exploration of the area for a subsidiary corporation of Utah 
Alloy Ores, Inc. (Tr. at 314) and evaluated drilling logs and 
established the course of the drilling program (Tr. at 314-15, 
328). He also consulted with numerous outside geologists about 
the mining claims in the Yellow Cat area (Tr. at 315, 351). In 
short, appellant Silliman became thoroughly familiar with the 
places on these claims where drilling had been done and ore had 
been mined, or where there was an outcrop of anything that 
would indicate the presence of mineralization (Tr. at 300). 
The dispute in this case arose as a consequence of the 
attempted location by respondents, in the years 1974 to 1978, 
of claims overlying those of appellants. The first of these 
conflicting claims to be located was a group of twenty (20) 
claims located by respondents Powells in April 1974. Another 
sixty-eight (68) claims were located by Powells the summer of 
the following year during the period June 16, 1975 to August 
23, 1975. Nine (9) more claims were located by Powells from 
September 18, 1975 to July 12, 1976, for a total of 
ninety-seven (97) Powell claims (Defendants' Exhibit 60). The 
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greater number of these claims conflict with one or more of all 
except about a dozen of appellants' 84 claims. 
The other unresolved claims conflicting with those of 
appellants are twelve (12} located by Teares, or their 
predecessors in interest, five (5) in the period June 4 to 
August 25, 1977, and seven (7) more located in the i~terval 
September 4, 1977 to May 10, 1978 (Defendants' Exhibit 78}. 
All of these Teare claims were located after the filing of this 
lawsuit on January 10, 1977. 
The parties agree that the area in dispute was open to 
location under federal law at the time the parties located 
their respective claims except insofar as the land may have 
been withdrawn by the prior location of other mining claims. 
All respondents, with the exception of the Rowes who have 
entered into a separate stipulation of settlement with 
appellants, have also admitted that appellants' claims were 
located prior to those of respondents (Record at 116). The 
only evidence offered at trial on the issue of whether the land 
occupied by appellants' claims had previously been located by 
others not parties and thus made unavailable for location by 
appellants 1failed to demonstrate such prior location by anyone 
else (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2, Defendants' Exhibit 18, Tr. at 
174-79, 205, 211, 216-17, 660-62, 931-33}. 
By stipulations, the parties have agreed that there is 
no issue of the discovery of ore on each of appellants' claims 
with the exception of Little Pittsburgh 1, Little Pittsburgh 2, 
-7-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mineral Alloy 2, Mineral Alloy 3, Telluride 4 and Parco 1 (Tr. 
at 548-49 and Stipulation for Settlement of Issues between 
Plaintiffs and Rowe Defendants, dated May 14, 1979, part of the 
Record on appeal but erroneously not numbered as a part 
thereof). However, at the trial uncontroverted evidence 
established that ore was mined and shipped from Little 
Pittsburghs 1 and 2 in the period 1951 to 1954 (Tr. at 17-18, 
38, 57-58, 383-84). In 1954, at least 50 tons of ore were 
mined and shipped from Parco 1 (Tr. at 386). Also, drilling in 
1952 on Telluride 4, Mineral Alloy 2, and Mineral Alloy 3 
revealed the presence of uranium oxide ore fairly evenly 
distributeq with a concentration of eight one-hundreths of one 
per cent (.08% 0308) (Tr. at 383-86). 
An engineering student hired to survey the existing 
claims of appellant in 1953 and 1954 testified that almost all 
discovery monuments were then in place on the ground with 
discovery notices posted, that many corner monuments were 
found, and that where missing or in need of improvement, the 
corner and discovery monuments were reconstructed and that all 
missing notices of location were replaced (Tr. at 9-11, 
28-29). This work was attested to by appellant Silliman (Tr. 
at 288-89, 491-92, 936-37). The balance of appellants' claims, 
located in 1956 after the land was reopened to entry, were 
marked by discovery and corner monuments placed there by 
appellant Silliman, who also posted appropriate notices of 
location on the newly located claims (Tr. at 937-39). Notices 
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of location for all the foregoing claims to which appellants 
assert title were subsequently recorded (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 
2, 27, Tr. at 283-85). 
The trial court seems to have implicitly recognized 
that all requirements for the valid location of appellants' 
claims were met as it directed its findings only to the issues 
of abandonment and the adequacy of the assessment work done by 
appellants (R. at 121-22) . 
When some of the claims were later surveyed in 1956 
and again in 1965, many of appellants' corner monuments were 
still standing, and those that were not were re-erected or 
replaced (Tr. at 62-63, 65, 75-76, 78-79, 81-82, 108, 494-96). 
During the 1970s, whenever appellant Silliman saw corner 
monuments that were down, he re-erected them (Tr. at 498-500). 
When in 1978, after the filing of the suit, some of the 
appellants' claims were resurveyed, the surveyor noted the 
presence of many of appellants' corner monuments, though some 
but not all of the notices identifying the claims delineated by 
the monuments had been removed or obliterated over time (Tr. at 
125-29, 130). Respondents also introduced evidence tending to 
show that some of appellants' monuments or notices had 
deteriorated or otherwise been lost over the years prior to 
respondents' attempted relocation of appellants' claims (Tr. at 
565, 575, 583, 593, 632-33, 683-84, 688, 730, 792, 795-96, 
813-14, 842-43, 895). Yet, as respondents acknowledged seeing 
old monuments and mine workings, the thrust of their 
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observations went not to a complete absence of markings but 
merely to respondents' difficulty in identifying in the field 
the extent, ownership, and current status of the old claims 
(Tr. at 565, 632-37, 638, 675-76, 682-84, 690, 730-31, 797 800, 
842, 891, 895). 
The Powell respondents.testified they "asked around" 
and otherwise attempted to ascertain the current owners and 
status of possibly conflicting claims that might be prior to 
their own and that this undertaking did not disclose 
appellants' interest (Tr. at 565-67, 632-638). This was 
contradicted by evidence that Mr. Bene, one of the previous 
surveyors of some of the appellants' claims, told Powells in 
August 1975, while on the property in issue to survey Powells' 
newly located claims, that he thought appellants had a current 
and valid interest in the same area {Tr. at 73-75). This 
conversation was denied by respondent Dan Powell {Tr. at 
610-13), who admitted, however, that Powells understood the law 
to say that monuments on the ground need not be maintained once 
properly erected {Tr. at 594). Mr. Bene further stated that 
Powells' response to being informed of appellants' interest in 
the property was to say the validity of this interest turned on 
"whether the assessment work has been done during the last few 
years" {Tr. at 75). 
Extensive testimony was heard at trial on the nature 
and sufficiency of the assessment work performed by appellants 
to meet the annual one hundred dollars ($100) worth of labor 
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per claim required by 30 U.S.C. § 28 for the assessment years 
ending September 1, 1973, through September 1, 1977. These 
were the years immediately preceding the dates of respondents' 
attempted relocation of appellants' claims. 
Most of the appellants' assessment work was done with 
a Caterpillar D-6 B bulldozer with a 12 1/2-foot blade, which 
was owned by appellant Silliman (Tr. at 306-307). The 
bulldozer was operated primarily by appellant Silliman, 
although occasionally appellant's son Blaine Silliman operated 
the bulldozer as well. An outside party was once hired to 
operate the bulldozer for a day or two (Tr. at 398-400). 
Appellant Silliman typically operated the bulldozer 10 to 12 
hours a day while performing the assessment work, and 
occasionally up to 14 hours a day (Tr. at 401). Silliman's 
objective was to work at least 200 hours a year doing 
assessment work for the benefit of appellants' claims (Tr. at 
402, 445). Appellant Silliman calculated the value to his 
claims of his personal operation of the bulldozer or that of 
another operator working under his direct supervision at $50 
per hour (Tr. at 407). While appellant Silliman was not 
actually paid $50 per hour by appellant Utah Alloy Ores, Inc., 
this was apparently because Silliman had the claims under lease 
from 1961 on, and a condition of the lease was that he perform 
the assessment work (Tr. at 475). Even working for other 
parties on other property, appellant Silliman would charge 
approximately $30 an hour (Tr. at 405-407). 
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Respondents attempted to produce evidence of a lower 
valuation per hour for the assessment work done by appellants 
by introducing testimony that in 1971 one independent 
contractor charged $16 per hour for a 06 Caterpillar with an 
operator (Tr. at 648). However, respondents' witness testified 
that rates had gone up tremendously since that time. 
Furthermore, the quoted rate did not include any charge for the 
supervision of such an outside operator necessary to insure 
that the proper work was done to develop the claims. Another 
independent operator testified for respondents that for the 
operation of a 06 Caterpillar with a blade on it he charged $15 
per hour in 1972; $17 in 1973; $20 in 1974; $23 in 1975; $25 in 
1976; $30 in 1977; $34 in 1978; and $40 in 1979 (Tr. at 830). 
Again, these rates did not apparently include any charge for 
the supervision of this work by the owner of the mining 
claims. Furthermore, this contractor stated that he would 
charge an additional amount for the time necessary to haul the 
Caterpillar to and from the job site. The rates for hauling 
the equipment to the job site and back were usually within a 
dollar or two of what was charged for the operation of the 
Caterpillar (Tr. at 831). 
Much of the assessment work during the years in issue 
was done by appellant Silliman with his bulldozer in stripping 
or removing the overburden from potential ore bodies, in 
constructing drill sites for future drilling, in preserving the 
existing mine workings, and in maintaining and improving 
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existing roads and constructing new roads on or about 
appellants' claims. These roads facilitated the development 
and mining of these claims by providing access to the claims 
and the ore bodies thereunder for drilling rigs, ore trucks, 
and all other necessary vehicles (Tr. at 306, 349-83). 
More specifically, the assessment work for appellants' 
claims, broken down year by year, included the following: 
For the assessment year September 1, 1972, to September 1, 1973 
1. Drill sites at least 20 feet wide built on the Little 
Pittsburgh claim nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, and on Allor 11 and 
Allor 12 which drill sites were used two or three 
years later for actual drilling. 
2. Normal road maintenance and rehabilitation that 
included widening roads to facilitate the passage of 
larger equipment on the property and the reducing of 
grades on hills too steep to be negotiated by trucks 
and drill rigs. 
3. Stripping of overburden on the Little Pittsburgh 
claims nos. 3 and 4. 
Date 
October 1972 
November 1972 
August 1973 
Total 
Hours 
63 
65 
84 
212 
At $50 per hour this equals $10,600 (Tr. at 349-55). 
Assessment work valued at $8,400 would have been sufficient to 
preserve all of appellants' eighty-four (84) claims, had all 84 
been located over during the following year, which they were 
not. 
Powells located twenty (20) claims on April 12, 1974, 
hoping to take advantage of alleged deficiencies in the 
assessment work performed by appellants during 1972-1973. 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
These Powell claims conflict with the following eight (8) 
claims of appellants: 
Allor 21-23; 
Molly Hogan 1 & 2; 
Telluride 5, 8 & 9. 
(Compare Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12 with Defendants' Exhibit 58.) 
For the assessment year September 1, 1973 to September 1, 1974 
1. Approximately 20 hours work stripping the overburden 
on Memphis 1 and Memphis 4. 
2. Clearing drill sites on Little Pittsburgh No. 4 for 
the subsequent Bogner drilling [1976-77 & 1977-78] and 
approximately 20 to 25 hours work clearing drill sites 
on Telluride 8 and 9. 
3. Approximately 10 hours work building dams around the 
portals on Allor 12 with the construction of ditches 
to carry water away from the mines so they would not 
be unduly damaged. 
4. Road maintenance and rehabilitation work. 
445-46) • 
Date 
March 1974 
August 1974 
Total 
Hours 
110 
93 
203 
At $50 per hour this equals $10,150 (Tr. at 355-59, 
Powells located sixty-eight (68) claims in June 
through August of 1975, hoping to take advantage of alleged 
deficiencies in the appellants' assessment work for 1973-1974. 
These Powell claims conflict with the following sixty-eight 
(68) claims of appellants: 
A 1-3; 
Allor 1-9, 11-13, 15-23, & 26-33; 
CB 1, 2, & 4-7; 
Little Pittsburgh 3-8; 
Memphis 1-4; 
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Mineral Alloy No. 2; 
Molly Hogan 1 & 2; 
Parco 2, 5-7, 10, 23, & 25; 
Skinney & Skinney No. l; 
Telluride 2-4, 7-8, 12, 18 & 25. 
(Compare Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12 with Defendants' Exhibit 
58.) 
For the assessment year September 1, 1974, to September 1, 
1975 
1. Approximately 30 hours preparing drill sites on Parco 
23. 
2. About 20 hours preparing drill sites on Telluride 8 
and 9 and on Allor 21 and 23. 
3. Twenty hours opening the portal on Telluride 8 and 9 
and repairing the access road to the mine portal from 
the haulage roads. 
4. Thirty hours work stripping overburden on Little 
Pittsburgh 3 and 4. 
5. Five hours doing portal repair work on Allor 12. 
6. Road maintenance and rehabilitation including 
specifically the portions down to and around the 
Silver Moon, to Little Pittsburgh 1 and 2 and over to 
Allor 12. 
446-48). 
Date 
September 1974 
August 1975 
Total 
Hours 
90 
1-22 
212 
At $50 per hour this equals $10,600 (Tr~ at 359-61, 
The nine remaining Powell claims located between 
September 18, 1975, and July 12, 1976, in hopes of taking 
advantage of the alleged forfeiture for failure to do adequate 
assessment work in 1974-1975, conflict with the following 
twenty-two (22) claims of appellants: 
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A 2; Allor 6-7, 13, 16-19, 24, 26-28, & 33; 
Memphis 2 & 3; 
Parco 6-7, 10, & 23; 
Telluride 1, 7, & 18. 
(Compare Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12 with Defendants' Exhibit 58.) 
For the assessment year September 1, 1975 to September 1, 1976 
1. More drill sites were built on Parco 23. 
2. Road maintenance and rehabilitation on all of the 
primary roads in the area including specifically about 
10 hours work on the road from Allor 1 across Mineral 
Alloy 2 and 3 and Little Pittsburgh 2; and stripping 
on Little Pittsburgh 1 and Little Pittsburgh 2. 
Date 
February 1976 
August 1976 
Total 
Hours 
95 
132 
227 
At $50 per hour this equals $11,350 for the work done 
by appellant Silliman with his bulldozer. 
Additionally, on August 25, 1976, drilling work was 
commenced by Schumacher Drilling and supervised by appellant 
Silliman along a line or "fence" from Allor 12 along Little 
Pittsburgh 6, Little Pittsburgh 5, Allor 11 to Little 
Pittsburgh 3 and 4. Though the drilling rig broke down August 
26th, repairs were soon made and drilling recommenced September 
12, 1976 and was completed by about September 20, 1976. Some 
21 holes were drilled for a total distance of 3,065 feet at a 
charge per foot of $3 for probing, drilling, and logging 
resulting in a total bill of $9,195 (Tr. at 361-70, 388, 
533-34}. The total value of all assessment work done by 
appellants during this assessment year was, therefore, $20,545. 
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The Teare claims named Lone Indian 1-5, located the 
following summer between July 4, 1977, and August 25, 1977, 
conflict with the following eight Silliman claims: 
Allor 1 & 2; 
Little Pittsburgh 1 & 2; 
Mineral Alloy 2 & 3; 
Telluride 4 & 25. 
(Compare Plaintiffs' Exhibit 11 with Plaintiffs' Exhibit 107; 
Tr. at 976-78.) 
Assessment year from September 1, 1976 to September 1, 1977 
1. About five hours road work in the area of Little 
Pittsburgh 1 and 2, Mineral Alloy 2 and 3, and 
Telluride 4 which was stopped by Mr. Teare while 
Silliman was working on Mineral Alloy 2 and 3. 
2. More drill sites built on Parco 23. 
3. General road maintenance and rehabilitation in the 
area of all the claims. 
Date Hours 
August 1977 210 
At $50 per hour this equals $10,500 for bulldozer work. 
Additionally, drilling work was done on Little 
Pittsburgh 3 and 4, Allor 12, and on Telluride 8 and 9 by J & J 
Drilling [Bogner] for a total distance of 1,060 feet at a 
charge of $2 per foot for a total bill of $2,120 paid by 
appellants. This drilling penetrated ore bearing formation and 
was evaluated by appellant Silliman. These holes were logged 
by Idaho Mining Company for an additional charge of $600 (Tr. 
at 371-76, 388). The total value of assessment work done by 
appellants during this assessment year was, therefore, $13,220. 
-17-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Seven more claims were located by Teares after the 
period of this work during the interval September 4, 1977 to 
May 10, 1978, which claims conflict with the following claims 
of appellant: 
Mineral Alloy 2 & 3; 
Parco l; 
Telluride 4. 
(See Defendants' Exhibits 83 and 85; Tr. at 906-913.) 
For the assessment year September 1, 1977, to September 1, 1978 
1. More drill site work on Parco 23. Portal repair work 
on Parco 23. 
2. About eight hours work repairing roads on Little 
Pittsburgh 1 and 2, Mineral Alloy 2 and 3, and 
Telluride 4. 
3. General maintenance and road rehabilitation work on 
the main roads used when drilling or otherwise moving 
across appellants property from one extremity of the 
area to the other. 
Date 
March 1978 
April 1978 
Total 
Hours 
105 
90 
195 
At $50 per hour this bulldozer work equals $9,750. 
Again, more drilling was done by Bogner on Allor 12, 
Little Pittsburgh 6, Little Pittsburgh 5, Little Pittsburgh 4, 
and on Telluride 8 and 9 and on Memphis 1 through S. These 
holes were drilled on some of the drill sites prepared during 
the previous four years. Bogner drilled 2,110 feet at a charge 
of $2 per foot for a total bill of $4,220. The holes were 
logged by appellant Silliman's son and evaluated by the 
Sillimans (Tr. at 376-81). The total value of assessment work 
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done by appellants during this assessment year was, therefore, 
$13,970. 
The work done during this assessment year is relevant 
as showing the good faith of appellants in continuing to 
develop their mining claims even after commencement of the 
suit, although respondents did not attempt to locate additional 
mining claims conflicting with those of appellants in the 
period following this assessment year. 
Appellant Silliman testified at trial that he did not 
go over each and every road each year as some of the roads 
either did not need much work or were not being used 
sufficiently to justify the work (Tr. at 963-65). He did 
affirm, however, that over a period of about three years, 
almost every road would be checked or maintained with the 
possible exception of those going to Parco 1, Parco 3, and 
Parco 3 East (Tr. at 382-83). Appellants' primary concern was 
not to maintain every road on the property, but only those main 
or principal roads whose use was expected to be more frequent 
and necessary for the transport of drills and other equipment 
to the claims. However, maintenance work was intentionally 
omitted from the short stretch of road leading to the main camp 
where buildings and equipment were located to reduce the 
possibility of looting (Tr. at 449-51, 963). 
When respondents questioned the value of appellants' 
annual program of maintenance of the principal roads, 
especially for years when no drilling or mining equipment was 
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carried over those roads, appellant Silliman pointed out that 
the annual flashflooding and sand drifting in the area has a 
cumulative effect that would not allow for the saving of any 
significant amount of repair work or time if postponed for any 
period of time (Tr. at 536-37). Furthermore, when appellants 
offered to prove the increased size of more modern drilling and 
mining equipment in justification of appellants' improvement 
program of road widening, respondents' objection was sustained 
by the court (Tr. at 323). 
Respondents also questioned whether appellants 
performed all of the assessment work they claimed to have done 
(Tr. at 963-65). Respondents attempted to show that not all of 
this work claimed by appellants was performed by introducing 
photographs of roads that obviously had not been improved or 
maintained for a while (Defendants' Exhibits 61-65, Tr. at 
618-27). Three of the five photos depicted either the road 
leading to the main camp that Silliman had already testified he 
purposely did not maintain to prevent looting (Tr. at 449-50), 
or another road in the same area that had long since been 
abandoned (Tr. at 450). The two other photographs, Exhibits 63 
and 65, taken in 1977, showed little used and therefore little 
maintained roads in areas where Powells had attempted 
relocations over two years previously. 
Respondents also offered vague testimony to the effect 
that those attempting to relocate claims in the disputed area 
noticed little or no evidence of recent assessment work (Tr at 
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606, 709, 842}. Yet respondents introduced nothing else to 
contradict the detailed recital of assessment work performed by 
appellants for their claims, although respondents did try to 
bolster their weak attack on the quantity of assessment work 
performed by appellants by implying Silliman's memory and 
credibility were suspect since he produced virtually no written 
records from the time the assessment work was done to verify 
his account of that work (Tr. at 346, 420-26}. When later 
Silliman discovered a few such records, they were promptly 
disclosed and tendered (R. at 285-95}. Furthermore, 
respondents introduced nothing to contradict the tendency of 
the work done by appellants to benefit their claims or to show 
that this work was done with any other intent than to develop 
the claims. Indeed, evidence of assessment work done by 
respondents showed they had engaged in the same type of road 
work, drill site excavation, and drilling as appellants (Tr. at 
653-58, 750-53, 800-811, 967-73}. 
Appellant Silliman repeatedly testified to his intent 
to benefit all of his claims with his general roadwork program 
and to his belief that all the claims actually were so 
benefitted by this work (Tr. at 349, 355, 358-59, 361-62, 373, 
378-79, 535}. He substantiated this belief by testifying to 
the way in which the underlying uranium was deposited along 
trends paralleled by the overlying mining claims. He pointed 
out that information yielded from one area of the claims also 
benefits the other areas. Thus roads required to explore and 
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service one part of the claims also benefit even outlying 
portions of the larger group of claims (Tr. at 535) • 
Silliman's testimony on this point was buttressed by 
that of Mr. James R. Andrus, an exploration geologist with 
twenty-two years of experience in exploring for and mining 
uranium, who had examined the area of appellants' claims in the 
company of Silliman and another geologist and mining engineer 
of his employer, Energy Fuels Nuclear, Inc. (Tr. at 225-27, 
230-32). Andrus testified that the results of the mining on 
appellants claims demonstrated that the uranium there was "in 
trend" (Tr. at 234). He went on to say that where a trend is 
established, it is there for five miles and can be used almost 
that far (Tr. at 242). When pressed by counsel for respondents 
as to how far the benefit extended from any drill hole, Andrus 
advocated an exploration program of widely-spaced drilling at 
intervals of approximately one-half mile, but he refused to 
limit the benefit from even barren holes to such a limited 
distance (Tr. at 239-41). Continuing, Andrus stated that with 
a knowledge of the presence of a trend and something· about how 
it was situated, drilling up on the Little Pittsburgh claims in 
the northeast corner of appellants' group could well benefit 
claims down in the far southwest corner such as the Allor 23 
(Tr. at 242-43). Although he indicated that a small mining 
operator, due to limited funds and the inability to explore out 
very far, might only receive benefit within a 500 foot radius 
from a drill hole, he also stated that given the history of 
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appellant's claims, he "would look as far as the claims that I 
controlled would allow me to look" (Tr. at 248, 240). Finally, 
he indicated that the results for each hole drilled, when added 
together with the results of all previous exploratory efforts 
in the area, contribute positively to an overall picture and 
understanding of the ore formations in the general area (Tr. at 
267). No attempt was made to rebut this expert testimony with 
testimony from another witness. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE LOWER COURT MISAPPLIED THE STANDARDS OF LAW 
APPLICABLE TO THE COMMON DEVELOPMENT OF 
ASSOCIATED MINING CLAIMS. 
Once validly located on ground open to location under 
federal law, an unpatented mining claim may continue to be held 
by the original locators or their successors free of any 
interest asserted by those who subsequently attempt to locate 
the same area as long as the requirements of 30 u.s.c. § 28 are 
met. In part, those requirements read: 
On each claim located after the 10th day of May 1872, 
and until a patent has been issued therefor, not less 
than $100 worth of labor shall be performed or 
improvements made during each year .••• but where 
such claims are held in common, such expenditure may 
be made upon any one claim; and upon a failure to 
comply with these conditions, the claim or mine upon 
which such failure occurred shall be open to 
relocation in the same manner as if no location of the 
same had ever been· made, provided that the original 
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locators, their heirs, assigns, or legal 
representatives, have not resumed work on the claim 
after failure and before such location. 
In a leading decision of the United States Supreme 
Court holding that the owner of a group of adjoining mining 
claims need not seek a separate patent for each, Justice Field 
for the majority of the Court noted that under the Act of May 
10, 1872 containing the provision just quoted: 
Labor and improvements within the meaning of the 
statute, are deemed to have been had on a mining 
claim, whether it consists of one location or several, 
when the labor is performed or the improvements are 
made for its development, that is, to facilitate the 
extraction of metals it may contain, though in fact 
such labor and improvements may be on ground which 
originally constituted only one of the locations, as 
in sinking a shaft, or be at a distance from the claim 
itself, as where the labor is performed for the 
turning of a stream, or the introduction of water, or 
where the improvements consist in the construction of 
a flume to carry off the debris or waste material. 
Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. (14 Otto) 636, 655 (1882). 
The nature of the annual labor requirement for claims 
held in common was elaborated upon by the Court the following 
year in a case squarely presenting the issue of the 
satisfaction of the above statute. Jackson v. Roby, 109 U.S. 
440 (1883). The plaintiff was the senior locator of several 
adjoining mining claims. A flume was built to carry the waste 
material from the mining work on one of the claims to an 
adjoining claim. The claim where the tailings were deposited 
was covered by such waste to an extent greater than one-third 
of its area. No other work on or for the benefit of the 
half-buried claim was shown. The Court held that the plaintiff 
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had established no right to the adjoining claim on the 
receiving end of the flume. Justice Field, speaking for a 
unanimous Court, declared at 444: 
The contention of the plaintiff was made upon a 
singular misapprehension of the meaning of the act of 
Congress, where work or expenditure on one of several 
claims held in common is allowed in place of the 
required expenditure on the claims separately. In 
such case the work or expenditure must be for the 
purpose of developing all of the claims. It does not 
mean that all the expenditure upon one claim which has 
no reference to the development of the others will 
answer. 
The Court continued its elaboration of the benefit 
requirement for the common development of claims in Chambers v. 
Harrington, 111 U.S. 350 (1884.). In this case, on appeal from 
the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah whose decision is 
reported at 3 Utah 94, 1 P. 362 (1882), the primary issue was 
whether the sinking of a shaft in one claim benefited two other 
adjoining claims so as to preserve them from relocation by an 
adverse party. In affirming the finding of the trial court 
that the adjoining claims were so benefitted, the Utah Court 
quoted from Mt. Diablo Mill & Mining Company v. Callison, Fed. 
Cas. No. 9886, 5 Sawyer 439, 9 Morr. Min. Rep. 616, 632-33 
(C.C. Nev. 1879), as follows: 
Work done outside of the claim, or outside of any 
claim, if done for the purpose or as a means of 
prospecting or developing the claim, as in the case of 
tunnels, drifts, etc., is as available for holding the 
claim as if done within the boundaries of the claim 
itself. One general system may be formed, well 
adapted and intended to work several contiguous claims 
or lodes, and when such is the case, work in 
furtherance of the system is work on the claims 
intended to be developed by it. 
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision 
of the Utah Court finding the adjacent claims benefitted by the 
shaft on the other claim. It borrowed the same language quoted 
by the Utah Court for its statement of the benefit requirement 
and added to it, at 111 U.S. 353, the following: 
When several claims are held in common, it is in 
the line of this policy to allow the necessary work to 
keep them all alive, to be done on one of them. But 
obviously on this one the expenditure of money or 
labor must equal in value that which would be required 
on all the claims if they were separate or 
independent. It is equally clear that in such case 
the claims must be contiguous so that each claim thus 
associated may in some way be benefitted by the work 
done on one of them. 
Three main elements of the rule for the development of 
claims held in common emerge from a consideration of the 
classic passages set out above. First, the work must actually 
tend toward the development of the claims; i.e., it must 
benefit the claims by leading to the extraction of the minerals 
in place under the claims. Secondly, the work must be intended 
to benefit the claims. In other words, the efforts expended 
must have as their purpose the eventual extraction of the 
minerals. Finally, the work must be so organized as to benefit 
or lead to the development of the entire group of claims held 
in common. A reformulation of this final element may also 
assist. The government's interest is to see that as much of 
the minerals in the ground are extracted as possible. work 
benefitting only one or a few but substantially less than all 
claims will not accomplish this result. Therefore, there 
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should be some systematic approach that will tend to the 
development of substantially all the claims held in common and 
intended to be developed as a group. 
Mining claims are of ten best mined on a consolidated 
basis. Yet it may be virtually impossible to simultaneously 
develop all claims at one and the same time. Therefore, if 
work is so organized that it tends to the benefit of all the 
claims, even though work at any one moment may be concentrated 
on one or a few claims, this third element would be satisfied. 
This Court succinctly captured the essense of this third 
element in Nevada Exploration & Mining Co. v. Spriggs, 41 Utah 
171, 124 P. 770, 773 (1912), where it noted: 
We think that what is intended by the use of the term 
"system" or "general system" of work means simply 
this: That the work, as it is commenced on the 
ground, is such that, if continued, will lead to a 
discovery and development of the veins or ore bodies 
that are supposed to be in the claims, or, if these 
are known, that the work will facilitate the 
extraction of the ores and minerals. This latter 
purpose is well illustrated by the Supreme Court of 
Colorado in Doherty v. Morris, 17 Colo. 105 [28 P. 
85], where it is held that the construction of a wagon 
road leading to and making the claims accessible was 
sufficient as assessment work to prevent forfeiture of 
the claims. 
Ample evidence was presented at trial supporting the 
adequacy of the character of the assessment work performed by 
appellants for the benefit of their claims. The continued 
exploration and development program advocated by Mr. Andrus, an 
expert geologist who had examined the area in dispute, could 
not be accomplished without roads suitably maintained to 
provide access to the claims. Drilling in the most propitious 
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locations could not be accomplished without the excavation of 
suitable drilling sites. Pockets of shallowly deposited ore 
could not be extracted without the removal of the overburden. 
Furthermore, the drilling that was done in 1976, 1977, and 1978 
gave evidence of appellants' good faith in engaging in the 
preparatory work already described. Therefore, the performance 
by appellants of these and .other activities on and for the 
benefit of their claims was unmistakably work tending to 
develop the claims, thus fulfilling the first of the three 
elements outlined. 
Appellant Silliman testified that as to each 
assessment year in issue, he intended the assessment work he 
performed to benefit the entire group of claims owned by Utah 
Alloy Ores, Inc. or himself. Such testimony could only have 
come from him because no one else performed any significant 
amount of the assessment work. Inferences from objective facts 
support this view. Appellant Silliman's long and continual 
association with the property that had been actively mined and 
explored for over 20 years uniquely qualified him to appreciate 
the uranium deposits as yet unremoved. As lessee and later 
owner of these claims, Silliman had every incentive to develop 
the claims and extract the uranium lying thereunder. A great 
deal of ore had already been mined from these claims over the 
more than twenty years Silliman had been associated with the 
property. There could be no purpose to the work he performed 
in the period 1972 to 1978 except the purpose of satisfying the 
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assessment requirements. Thus, the intent or purpose element 
was clearly met. 
Testimony on the tendency of the work performed to 
develop the entire group of claims owned by appellants was 
given not only by appellant Silliman but also by geologist 
Andrus. Andrus testified that the uranium deposits in the area 
were clearly situated along a trend substantiated by previous 
mining activity to extend for probably five miles. He further 
testified that the claims overlay the trend of the mineral 
deposits and that, given what he knew of the geological 
formations and the previous activity in the area, he would, as 
an expert, continue exploration and development work as far as 
the claims extended. He indicated that the configuration of 
drilling holes made in prior years was such as to maximize the 
information yield that could be expected therefrom. Finally, 
he testified that each additional drill hole, whether barren or 
not, yields information which, when added to what is already 
known of the area, assists in adding more detail to the overall 
picture of the mineral deposit. The work carried on by Mr. 
Silliman was such that it would lead, if continued, to the 
discovery of new ore bodies and the extraction of known 
deposits. No attempt was made to offer additional testimony to 
refute this evidence which establishes the presence of a 
general system well adapted and intended to benefit all of 
appellants' claims by leading to the extraction of the 
underlying uranium. Such a system, tending to develop all 
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claims, satisfies the requirements of the third element 
outlined above. 
Yet the trial court made findings to the effect that 
not only was this assessment work insufficient in quantity, but 
that it was deficient in character. The trial court's Finding 
of Fact No. 18, reads in part: 
The testimony of plaintiff on assessment work for 
the various years was apparently re-constructed by 
plaintiff after the present suit was filed as to 
dates, the type of work performed and the value of 
said assessment and there was no substantial testimony 
showing plaintiff's intentions at the time the work 
was performed as to the claims the work would benefit 
and the extent and amount of such benefit. 
Some of the assessment work claimed by plaintiff 
was roadwork repeated each year over existing roads. 
There was no evidence as to which claims were 
benefitted by the road work and the extent in value of 
the road work as to any particular claims. Some of 
the assessment work was on millsites. There was no 
evidence that this work on millsites benefitted any 
particular claims or groups of claims, and there was 
no evidence that any mills has been erected on the 
millsites, and no evidence that plaintiff intended to 
construct any mills on any of the millsites. 
By reason of the above the Court is unable to 
make a finding as to the value of assessment work 
performed by plaintiff on any particular claim or 
groups of claims for any of the assessment years in 
question. 
Record at 145-46. 
The finding erroneously assumes that work in one 
location on appellants' claims cannot benefit claims located 
elsewhere along the chain of adjoining and overlapping claims 
overlying the trend of mineral deposition unless discrete 
benefit values can be assigned to specific individual claims. 
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The trial court's approach demands that the total benefit of 
such work accruing to an extended area of mineralization be 
broken down into artifically small and somewhat arbitrary 
segments that may be conveniently matched with individual 
claims or smaller groups of claims forming only part of a 
larger group. This ignores not only the facts in this case but 
the basic rationale for allowing claims to be developed by a 
common plan. Indeed, one requirement of a common development 
scheme is that the work tend to benefit substantially all the 
claims. Jackson v. Roby. It will only rarely be the case in 
such circumstances that the benefit accruing to each claim from 
such work may be precisely calculated. Accordingly, appellants 
submit that the trial court did not correctly apply the law to 
the facts of the present case. This is prejudicial error 
requiring reversal. 
Further indications that the trial court did not 
adequately understand or apply the rules of law explained above 
for the development of claims held in common are contained in 
the trial court's reference in Finding of Fact No. 18 to 
assessment work on millsites. First, appellants claim but one 
millsite. Secondly, nowhere in his testimony does appellant 
Silliman explicitly mention work on a millsite. Thirdly, 
millsites are not subject to the annual labor requirement. 2 
Lindley on Mines§ 638 (3rd ed. 1914). However, the trial 
transcript is replete with references to drill sites upon which 
significant work was expended to prepare the sites for later 
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drilling, actually prosecuted, in many cases, within two to 
four years. It certainly appears that the trial court confused 
both the facts and the law applicable thereto. 
Road work has often been sustained as valid assessment 
work. In Doherty v. Morris, 17 Colo. 105, 28 P. 85 (1891)' 
cited with approval by this Court in Nevada Exploration and 
Mining Co. v. SEriggs, as already noted, no ordinary 
development work was done within the surf ace boundaries of the 
claim found by the Supreme Court of Colorado to have been 
preserved from relocation by the construction of a wagon road 
up a gulch to the claim and to an adjoining claim. At 28 P. 
86, that court stated: 
We do not hesitate to assert that labor 
performed by the owner of a mine in 
constructing a wagon road thereto for the 
purpose of better developing and operating 
the same may be treated as a compliance with 
the law relating to annual assessment work 
thereon. 
The Washington State Supreme Court has upheld the 
validity of road work when contested in Sexton v. Washington 
Mining and Milling Co., 55 Wash. 380, 104 P. 614 (1909) and in 
Florence-Rae Copper Co. v. Kimbel, 85 Wash. 162, 147 P. 881 
(1915). California district courts of appeal have done the 
same in Ring v. United States Gupsum Co., 62 Cal. App. 87, 216 
P. 409 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1923); Lind v. Baker, 31 Cal. App. 
2d 631, 88 P.2d 777 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1939) (rebuilding a 
private road leading to several mining claims after it was 
washed out in a flood); and Brown v. Murphy, 36 Cal. App. 2d 
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161, 97 P.2d 281 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1939) (the repair after 
each rain of a good road leading to a group of claims) . 
In Pinkerton v. Moore, 66 N.M. 11, 340 P.2d 844 
(1959), the New Mexico Supreme Court found reconnaissance work 
inadequate in character but treated the repair of access roads 
as so patently beneficial to mining claims that it upheld this 
road work as valid in character virtually as a per se matter. 
The federal district court in United States v. 9,947.71 Acres 
of Land, 320 F. Supp. 328 (D.C. Nev. 1963), seemed to be of the 
same view. 
The federal government, speaking through an acting 
solicitor of the Department of the Interior in an opinion 
entitled Rights of Mining Claimants to Access Over Public Lands 
to their Claims, 66 I.D. 361 (1959), noted at 364 that: 
The Department has recognized that roads were 
necessary and complementary to mining activities. It 
early adopted the policy of recognizing work done on 
the construction of roads to carry ore from mining 
claims as legitimate development work accreditable to 
the claims as assessment and patent work. 
The solicitor's opinion went on to note that this 
early policy, after a brief hiatus at the turn of the century, 
was reaffirmed in Tacoma & Roche Harbor Lime Co., 43 L.D. 128 
(1914). This case held that road work is to be considered 
proper assessment work along the lines suggested by Lindley in 
Sections 629 and 631 of his treatise. Lindley notes the 
necessity of roadways to develop mining claims and acknowledges 
that expenditures to build roads for this purpose may be 
credited toward assessment requirements. He cautions, however, 
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that roads are not necessarily mining improvements and urges 
that roads built or maintained for other purposes do not 
represent legitimate assessment work. 
The road work performed by appellants satisfies these 
common sense conditions. The roads built and maintained by 
appellants on or leading to their claims were constructed 
exclusively for mining purposes. 
Though this Court has not had many opportunities to 
pass on the sufficiency of road work as assessment work, one 
such case was New Mercur Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining Co., 
102 Utah 131, 128 P.2d 269 (1942), cert. den. 319 U.S. 753 
(1943). There, the road work in question was the construction 
of a road commenced the day before the end of the assessment 
year. While this Court held that the claimants could not rely 
upon this work to satisfy the annual assessment requirement, 
the reason for that holding was expressly given: The claimants 
"failed to prove that they built the road." 128 P.2d at 272. 
Had such proof been made, there is no intimation in the opinion 
that the road work would have been disallowed. 
Indeed, in Knight v. Flat Top Mining Co., 6 Utah 2d 
51, 305 P.2d 503 (1957), this Court upheld the findings of the 
trial court that repairing a pathway for access to claims was 
adequate resumption of assessment work to preserve the claims 
from relocation, and that the repair of existing roads to be 
used in transporting ore that was to be mined later from the 
claims was also good assessment work. 
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Appellants concede that the determination of the 
adequacy of assessment work is normally a matter for the trier 
of fact. ~, 2 Lindley on Mines § 630, at 1555. Yet 
respondents introduced no evidence rebutting the beneficial 
character of appellants' assessment work. Respondents 
restricted their attack to the sufficiency of the quantity of 
the assessment work done. A statement made by this Court in 
New Mercur seems particularly apropos: 
Appellant introduced no evidence discrediting the 
above testimony; hence, it remains undisputed. There 
does not appear in the record any evidence that the 
work was a subterfuge, or done in bad faith. On the 
contrary, there appears nothing but uncontradicted 
testimony that the work was practical, tending to 
develop the claims, and that it was done in good faith, 
. • . • One general system was conceived and well 
adapted in light of the physical surroundings and the 
geological information then available. (Citations 
omitted.) 
128 P.2d at 273. The situation in the present case is exactly 
that described above by the Court in New Mercur. 
Although it is not clear from the obscurity of the 
trial court's Memorandum Decision and the findings later 
entered, it may be that the trial court thought the work of 
appellants did not satisfy the "general system" requirement for 
the development of claims held in common. If so, this was error 
at variance with what this Court stated in Nevada Exploration 
and Mining Co. v. Spriggs, 124 P. at 772, to-wit: 
There is some direct and positive evidence from expert 
miners and mining engineers in the record that the 
shaft and the drifts as constructed tended to develop 
the whole group of claims, and that the work was also 
proper as prospecting work. We think the trial court 
was right in not substituting his own judgment for that 
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of the mining men and engineers. The courts sho~ld be 
very slow, indeed, in holding that certain work ~s not 
calculated to develop certain mining claims, or is not 
proper prospecting work, when there is competent 
evidence that such is the effect of the work in 
question, and where there is no evidence to the 
contrary. 
Appellants respectfully submit that the trial court in 
the case at bar erred as a matter of law in demanding that the 
road maintenance and improvement program of appellants should be 
credited to only those particular claims upon which the physical 
labor was actually expended in any given year or to those few 
claims so immediately proximate thereto that might properly be 
said, in different circumstances, to be the only claims 
forseeably benefitted by such work. Here, appellants' road 
work, as undertaken on or leading to any particular claim in the 
group, inured to the benefit of all other claims controlled by 
appellants due to the extent and orientation of the underlying 
ore bodies. 
In addition to the three requirements set forth above, 
it is often suggested that Chambers v. Harrington, supra, 
established another requirement, that is, that the claims being 
developed as a group all be contiguous. ~, 2 Lindley on 
Mines, § 630 at 1551 (3rd ed. 1914). Yet Lindley notes that the 
Supreme Court of Colorado, in Hain v. Mattes, 34 Colo. 345, 83 
P. 127 (1905), concluded that, to quote Lindley at 1551, "the 
decisions asserting or assuming the necessity for contiguity are 
mere dicta, and that contiguity is a non-essential." He then 
notes that the California Supreme Court, in Big Three Mining 
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Company v. Hamilton, 157 Cal. 130, 107 P. 301, 305 (1910), was 
of the same opinion. Lindley then states, at page 1552 of his 
treatise: 
If work done outside of a group of claims can be 
credited to such group, it would seem logical that 
work on a noncontiguous claim should be so credited, 
provided, of course, that the work responded to the 
general test of group development -- that is, that the 
work done tends to develop all the claims in the 
group. 
The Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation agrees with 
this latter statement. 
Many of the cases which allow certain types of work 
performed off a claim to count as assessment work only 
if performed on contiguous claims, recognize that 
other types of work performed off a claim may count as 
assessment work even if performed outside the 
boundaries of contiguous claims. [The passage from 
Smelting Company v. Kemp set out above is then 
quoted.] Roads to provide access to claims and ditches 
to provide water for mining, will satisfy as 
assessment work even though constructed outside of the 
claim boundaries. Assessment work may be performed on 
patent land, or even vacant public domain. 
Accordingly, it would seem that the continguity test 
is unrealistic, and that the true test should be 
whether the work tends to benefit the particular 
claim. (Footnotes omitted.) 
2 American Law of Mining § 7.18 (1~79). 
This Court, though perhaps responsible for originating 
the contiguity requirement in Harrington v. Chambers, 3 Utah 
94, 1 P. 362, 371, in what is arguably dicta, has already given 
limited recognition to the principle that work on a claim not 
strictly contiguous to another may qualify as assessment work 
for both claims. This occurred in the New Mercur opinion. The 
case is most often cited for its exposition of the community of 
interest principle, considered below. In the course of its 
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survey of the prior case law, however, this Court quoted an 
extended passage from Hain v. Mattes, to the effect that work 
on one claim, intended to benefit and actually benefitting 
another claim, is sufficient in character as assessment work 
for both claims regardless of whether the two claims are 
actually contiguous. In New Mercur, this Court approved the 
statement of law from Hain v. Mattes except as to claims 
separated by territory owned by a stranger (an exception made 
out of apparent concern for a desire to avoid countenancing 
trespasses). 128 P.2d at 274, 276. 
Appellants respectfully submit that contiguity, as the 
most strict degree of proximity, is probative of the extent of 
the actual benefit conferred on one claim by work on another, 
but that actual benefit can accrue without contiguity. 
Appellants' eight claims not contiguous with the main body of 
their claims did actually benefit from appellants' assessment 
work and should be preserved. 
To the extent community of interest is a further, 
distinct requirement for the common development of claims, that 
requirement is also satisfied in this case. The essence of the 
requirement is that there must be privity between the owner of 
the claim for which the work was performed and the owner of the 
property where the work was executed. As mentioned, New Mercur 
Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining Co. is the leading case on 
the topic. The facts of that case revealed that A owned one 
group of claims and B owned an adjoining group of claims. The 
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third party C had a lease from B with an option to purchase, 
and C also had a lease from A. The lessee, c, performed work 
in a tunnel upon a patented claim in B's group. This Court 
found that the work tended to benefit the claims owned by A and 
that the lessor-lessee relationships constituted sufficient 
privity. The Court concisely stated the community of interest 
principle in the following language from 128 P.2d at 275: 
[T]here must be some common right in the 
assessment work. The owner or owners of the 
claims whose continued possessory right is 
made to depend on the development work must 
have a legal relationship to the work if it 
is to inure to the benefit of the claim or 
claims for which it is contended it was 
done. 
Where, as in the case at bar, the assessment work was 
performed by the lessee and later owner of a largely contiguous 
body of claims, or under his direct supervision, there could be 
no clearer satisfaction of the community of interest 
requirement. 
The trial record plainly shows that appellants' 
assessment work satisfied all requisite conditions imposed by 
law for the common development of their mining claims. By not 
so finding, it is apparent that the trial court misapplied the 
law to the facts, as well as made clearly erroneous ·findings of 
fact relating to the quality of the assessment work. 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS 
ALLOCATION OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON 
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ASSESSMENT WORK. 
The law does not favor forfeitures. Knight v. Flat 
Top Mining Co., 6 Utah 2d 51, 305 P.2d 503 (1957)~ New Mercur 
Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining Co., 102 Utah 131, 128 P.2d 
269 (1942). As this Court noted in New Mercur: 
Because of this reluctance on the part of the law, 
ordinarily the party claiming the forfeiture of a 
title must both plead and establish it by clear and 
convincing proof. (Citations omitted.) 
128 P.2d at 272. 
The policy of avoiding forfeitures has received broad 
support though the rule has been variously formulated. The 
Arizona Supreme Court, following the lead of the New Mexico 
Supreme Court in Winslow v. Burns, 47 N.M. 29, 132 P.2d 1048 
(1943), stated: 
And as between a prior locator in possession and a 
subsequent locator, the evidence of the prior locator 
will be viewed in the most favorable light it will 
justify. 
Bagg v. New Jersey Loan Co., 88 Ariz. 182, 354 P.2d 40, 45 
(1960). Likewise, the Supreme Court of Wyoming adheres to the 
view that good faith attempts to comply with the law by a prior 
locator are to be construed liberally by the courts so as not 
to defeat the prior locator's claim by technical criticism. 
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Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377, 388 
(1960). 
This Court terms this approach favoring the senior 
locator an "indubitably sound principle, universally applied by 
courts in controversies over mining claims where forfeiture due 
to failure to do the assessment work is in question" in Morgan 
v. Sorenson, 3 Utah 2d 428, 286 P.2d 229, 231 (1955), where it 
quoted Emerson v. Mcwhirter, 133 Cal. 510, 65 P. 1036, 1038 
(1901), as follows: 
Where a valid location of a m1n1ng claim has been 
made, and work done thereon in good faith, possession 
maintained, and no evidence appears from which an 
intention to abandon may be inferred, the courts 
should construe the law liberally, to prevent 
forfeiture. 
Although appellants have the burden to show by 
substantial evidence that work performed outside the boundaries 
of any claim forming part of a group being commonly developed 
was both intended to develop the claim and did actually tend 
toward its development, that does not in any sense alter the 
ultimate burden of persuasion (or risk of nonpersuasion, as it 
is sometimes called) borne by respondents to show by clear and 
convincing proof that insufficient assessment work was done to 
create a forfeiture. The rule in New Mercur, which fails to 
distinguish between the two very different burdens (see 
McCormick on Evidence §336, 2nd ed. 1972), is not to the 
contrary. It merely states that a claimant who performs work 
off a claim has the burden to show "that the work was done for 
the development of all the claims and was so intended." 128 
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P.2d at 272. The reason for this "burden" is that such 
information is peculiarly within the claimant's knowledge. 
Where, as in this case, the appellants offered the only proof as 
to the benefit of work performed, respondents could not possibly 
be entitled to a forfeiture of appellants' claims. Clear and 
convincing rebuttal evidence would have been required. Only 
such an interpretation furthers the policy of favoring the first 
locator in a contest with a subsequent locator. 
Of course, wherever appellants performed assessment 
work within the boundaries of any claim, they had no burden at 
all to demonstrate that the work benefitted those claims. It is 
presumed that claims on which work is actually done benefit from 
that work where the work is of proper character. In order to 
cause forfeiture of those claims, respondents would have to show 
by clear and convincing proof that no work was actually done on 
those claims and that work done elsewhere did not benefit those 
claims. Appellants submit that this course was not followed by 
the trial court. 
The following portion of the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision reveals the improper framework used by the judge to 
evaluate the evidence presented. 
The evidence of the Plaintiffs does not convince the 
Court that sufficient or adequate assessment work was 
done in order to hold the conflict areas involved. 
The testimony of the other witnesses define an 
ostensible lack of assessment work, coupled with a 
general deterioration of corner and discovery 
monuments indicative of abandonment brought on by the 
discontinuance of the productive mining venture that 
existed in the years prior thereto. 
Record at 121. 
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Clearly, "an ostensible lack of assessment work" does not 
rise to the level of clear and convincing proof that adequate 
assessment work was not performed, which is what the law 
requires before the respondents can prevail. 
The concluding phrase of the quoted passage reflects 
further confusion in the court's mind. The court seemed to 
treat the deterioration of corner and discovery monuments as 
objective evidence indicative of abandonment and used that 
"evidence" to buttress the "ostensible lack of assessment 
work." This confuses two very distinct concepts in the law of 
mining -- abandonment and forfeiture. In 2 Lindley on Mines § 
643, at 1596-98, the distinction is expressed as follows: 
Abandonment is always a question of intention. 
In forfeiture the element of intent is not 
involved. It rests entirely upon the statute, and 
involves only the question, whether the terms of the 
law have been complied with. 
Abandonment operates instanter. Where a miner 
gives up his claim and goes away from it without any 
intention of returning, and regardless of what may 
become of it, or who may appropriate it, an 
abandonment takes place, and the property reverts to 
its original status as part of the unoccupied public 
domain. It is then publici juris, and open to 
location by the first comer. 
Forfeiture is not complete until someone else 
enters with intent to relocate the property. 
Abandonment may occur at any time, even after 
full compliance with the law as to performance of 
annual labor. Forfeiture will only ensue upon the 
lapse of the statutory period, on failure to represent 
the claim, and upon entry and location by another. 
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The language and holding of Knight v. Flat Top Mining 
Co., 6 Utah 2d 51, 305 P.2d 503 (1957), show that this Court 
makes the same distinction between the two doctrines. In that 
quiet title action, the trial court's finding that two claims 
had been neither abandoned nor forfeited was sustained on 
appeal, although no assessment work at all had been performed 
for a period of several years until the assessment year 
immediately prior to the time when an attempted relocation of 
the claims was made. This Court apparently thought that the 
performance of assessment work, even though of disputed 
character and following a period where no work at all was 
performed on the claims, so clearly negatived the requisite 
intent to abandon that abandonment was not even addressed as an 
issue in the appellate opinion. 
In the present case the performance of substantial 
assessment work by appellants for the benefit of their claims so 
plainly eliminated the issue of abandonment that any further 
consideration of the issue by the trial court was improper. 
Furthermore, it was manifest error for the trial court to use 
evidence relating solely to the issue of abandonment as evidence 
on the issue of the sufficiency of the assessment work to 
prevent a forfeiture. Indeed, the trial court's making of 
inferences adverse to appellants from the temporary cessation of 
active mining on the claims beginning in 1972 only compounded 
the error. As the Supreme Court of the United States has 
recently noted, "(t]he holder of a federal mining claim, by 
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investing $100 annually in the claim, becomes entitled to 
possession of the land and may make any use, or no use, of the 
minerals involved." Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co., 
Inc., 98 S.Ct. 2002, 2009 (1978). 
The inferences, made by the trial court from the 
deterioration of corner and discovery monuments, were also 
improper under the rule of law relating to the necessity for 
maintenance of such monuments. As stated by the Nevada Supreme 
Court in Nichols v. Ora Tahoma Mining Co., 62 Nev. 343, 151 P.2d 
615, at 622 (1944): 
The general rule is that when a location is once 
sufficiently marked on the surface so that its 
boundaries can be readily traced, and all other acts 
of location are performed as required by law, the 
right of possession is fully vested in the locator, 
and he cannot be divested of this right by the removal 
or obliteration or destruction of the monuments, 
stakes, marks or notices done without his fault, while 
he continues to perform the necessary work upon the 
claim. (Citations omitted.) 
This jurisdiction follows the same rule. Miehlich v. Tintic 
Standard Mining Co., 60 Utah 569, 211 P. 686, 690 (1922). 
The Nevada court, in applying this rule to the facts of 
that case which appear remarkably similar to those in the case 
at bar, noted, at 151 P.2d 623: 
When the Albert claims were originally located, the 
requisite location monuments and markings were placed 
upon the ground. Some of them were still there when 
defendants' claims were located. The record does not 
show that defendants took any notice of these 
monuments, made .any inquiry of plaintiffs regarding 
the boundaries of the Albert claims, or made any 
attempt to ascertain the lines of the senior 
locations. 
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Accordingly, the Nevada court held that under the facts 
presented, there was no abandonment or forfeiture validating the 
claims subsequently located by defendants. 
By not following these rules of law in the evaluation 
and weighing of the evidence presented in the present case, the 
trial court committed prejudicial error which demands reversal. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 
BY NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE 
OF APPORTIONMENT. 
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the trial 
court correctly determined that the amount of assessment work 
done on appellant's claims for the years in question was 
insufficient in quantity to save all of appellant's claims from 
relocation, there is yet another reason why the trial court's 
decision must be reversed and the case remanded. Under the 
doctrine firmly established by this Court, acting unanimously, 
in Utah Standard Mining Co. v. Tintic Indian Chief Mining & 
Milling Co., 73 Utah 456, 274 P. 950 (1929), the district court 
committed reversible error by failing to determine the value of 
the assessment work indisputably performed by appellants, which 
value should have been applied by the court to preserve a 
corresponding number of appellants' claims actually benefitted 
by this work from relocation by respondents. This was not an 
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inadvertent failure of the trial court, inasmuch as appellants 
formally objected to the absense of such findings from the 
proposed findings of fact and cited Utah Standard as authority 
in support of their position. 
In Utah Standard, the plaintiff brought an action to 
quiet title to ten unpatented mining claims which conflicted 
with some 13 of 22 mining claims previously located by 
defendants. The plaintiff sought to prove that defendants' 
claims were subject to relocation for failure to perform 
assessment work. Defendants introduced evidence at trial 
establishing that they had excavated a tunnel for a distance of 
about 75 feet at a value variously estimated at $25 to $30 per 
foot and that about two miles of road leading to the claims had 
been improved which roadwork was valued at six to nine hundred 
dollars. The plaintiff introduced evidence in rebuttal that led 
the trial court to find that 62.2 feet of tunnel work was done 
at a minimum value of $15 per foot for an undisputed value of 
$930. Apparently, the trial court did not find that the road 
work conferred any value. On appeal, this Court reversed the 
decision of the trial court and remanded the case for a new 
trial, apparently for a redetermination of the value of the work 
indisputably performed. In reaching this result, this Court 
also held that even if the valuation figures determined by the 
trial court were to stand, sufficient work was done to preserve 
at least nine of the thirteen claims in conflict from 
relocation. At 274 P. 951, this Court noted: 
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There is no principle of law that we are aware of 
which asserts that, if the owner of a group of 22 
claims undertakes to do the annual work for that 
group, as a consolidated group, and performs only the 
labor necessary for nine claims, he loses the benefit 
of that work on nine claims, provided it is in fact 
performed on one of the nine claims in such a way as 
to benefit the remaining eight, as well as the one 
upon which performed. In this case what is called the 
"big tunnel" is located on Tintic Indian Chief Claim 
No. 3, and projects slightly into the territory of 
Tintic Chief No. 2. The work was performed upon the 
claim which seems to be the most important one of the 
group. Inasmuch as the defendants indisputedly [sic] 
performed the work on this claim, they cannot lose the 
benefit of it. 
In the case at bar, it is likewise undisputed that 
appellants performed significant assessment work. Even 
disregarding for the moment the substantial roadwork done within 
the boundaries of one or more claims, which work was viewed with 
a jaundiced eye by the trial court, appellants also stripped 
overburden off potential ore bodies, construct·ed drill sites for 
future drilling, some of which drilling was performed during 
later assessment years, and did other work to preserve existing 
mine workings. No evidence was introduced by respondents to 
show that either this work was not performed or that it had no 
value for the mining claims. Nevertheless, the trial court 
refused to determine the value of this work in any year. 
Appellants willingly concede that cost, defined as that 
which was expended in terms of money for the performance of 
assessment work, is not necessarily equal to the value of that 
work. Indeed, value may far exceed cost. To quote Volume 2, § 
635, of Lindley's treatise at 1579: 
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Mere expenditure is not of itself sufficient. 
The work must tend to develop the claim and be of the 
reasonable value claimed. 
Cost is an element in establishing value, and 
while not conclusive, strongly tends to establish the 
good faith of the claimant. 
It is not material whether the labor performed is 
paid for or not, provided it is done at the 
instigation of the owner. The fulfillment of the 
provision of the law lies in the performance of the 
labor or the making of the improvements required, and 
not in the payment for it. 
Therefore, under the facts here present, it could 
hardly be controverted that the value of the assessment work 
performed by appellants, including the supervisory component of 
the work performed by appellant Silliman, substantially exceeds 
the fifteen to twenty dollar per hour figure indicated by 
respondents' evidence. Thus, under the apportionment doctrine 
of Utah Standard, even were there sufficient reason, which there 
is not, to reject the fifty dollar per hour valuation of 
appellants and to replace it with another slightly lower figure, 
the decision of the trial court in this case must be reversed 
for failure to preserve from relocation as many claims as would 
qualify with a new valuation figure. 
In this case it is not known whether the assessment 
work of appellants was insufficient in quantity to cover all 
their claims, because the trial court refused to make any 
finding as to the work's value. Following Utah Standard, a new 
trial must be had for a determination of that value. 
It should be noted, however, that inasmuch as not all 
84 of appellants' claims were ever located over in any single 
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year, the apportionment rule may well have no application to the 
instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the trial court's failure to properly apply the 
standards of law relating to the group development of claims 
held in common, for its failure to properly allocate the burden 
of proof, for its failure to make findings necessitated by the 
doctrine of apportionment, and for manifest confusion on what 
the facts were and on which facts were relevent to a 
determination of the issues in this case, or for any one of 
those errors, the trial court's decision should be reversed, 
all findings vacated, and this matter remanded for a new trial 
on the limited issue of compliance with the requirements of 30 
u.s.c. § 28. 
Respectfully submitted this /~+~day of July, 1980. 
SENIOR & SENIOR 
By Brent D. Ward 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs - Appellants 
1100 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellants were served upon counsel for each of the 
respondents by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to Duane A. 
Frandsen, of Frandsen, Keller & Jensen, attorneys for 
Respondents Powells, Professional Building, Price, Utah 84501, 
and to Aldine J. Coffman, Jr., of Coffman and Coffman, attorneys 
for Respondents Teares, Rowes & Penromer, at 59 East Center 
Street, Drawer J, Moab, Utah 84532, this / l:S +~ day of July, 
1980. 
f 
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